Books and Manuscripts

Unrecorded Autograph Document by Rufus King Regarding the Finances of the Floundering Post-Revolution American Government

“The impost alone than can afford us relief…established it will authorize such pecuniary negotiations as will greatly relief the national embarrassments, and in a short time fix the Faith and honor of our Country upon a solid foundation…”

(King, Rufus)
Autograph Document
No place, no date (presumably ca. 1786 or after). Single sheet, 12 7/8 x 16 in. (327 x 406 mm). Lengthy two-page autograph document, presumably in the hand of Rufus King; titled in another, likely later, hand, “Funding a Debt Notes of Speech” and “Funding Revolutionary Debt”.  Written in four columns per side; on J. Coles Britannia water-marked paper. Creasing from old folds; scattered ink smudging; uneven offsetting on first page.

Massachusetts Congressman Rufus King pens notes regarding the Confederation Congress's efforts to enhance its taxing powers. These notes were most likely composed sometime in 1786, a critical year for the young Republic when the threat of the Confederation‘s dissolution seemed imminent. Crushing war debt, a depressed economy, increasing sectional prejudices among the states, and foreign intrigue—worsened by the Confederation Congress’s persistent inability to perform the most basic forms of governance—led many of the country’s leading figures and Revolutionary heroes to believe that the experiment in liberty was on the precipice of “anarchy and confusion” (George Washington to Henry Knox, February 3, 1787). 

The Articles of Confederation’s intentional prevention of a strong centralized government, resulted in—among other problems—Congress’s inability to establish a reliable stream of revenue, hampering its ability to pay back its vast wartime debt. A lack of strong taxing power and Congress's reliance on yearly voluntary monetary requisitions from the state governments (that often went ignored) left the national government insolvent, without public credit, politically weak, and unable to provide for a common defense. Exacerbating much of this were conflicting state economic policies, and the lack of circulating currency throughout much of the nation. With Congress rudderless, the prospect of the nation’s disunion and descent into competing sectional confederacies, or worse, a return to British-style rule, seemed possible. An effort to remedy this in 1781 with the passage of a tax on imports failed after Rhode Island’s sole refusal. By mid-1786 a new impost bill, with an added tax called the Supplementary Fund, was headed for a similar fate. Drafted in 1783, the new bill called for a 5% tax on all imports and an additional $1.5 million in supplemental funds apportioned among the states (based on population), both limited to 25 years, and earmarked for wartime debts. For three years this bill remained mired in debates fueled by a fear of a loss of financial autonomy and state sovereignty. 

At this time, King was a representative for Massachusetts in the Confederation Congress, and at only 31 years old was respected for his eloquence, sharp mind, and dedication to public service. Hardly then a nationalist in the vein of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, or Robert Morris, who were calling for the Articles' complete overhaul (that sentiment would come later for King during the Constitutional Convention), King did come to recognize the limits the current Confederation posed for the survival of the young nation as a whole, and agreed that limited increases in its power must occur. Even this stance was a startling change from his earlier views while serving in the General Court of Massachusetts only two years prior, where he led the opposition against the impost and any increase in federal power. His short time in the national Congress had exposed him to its maddening deficiencies and impotency, and expanded his provincial worldview. In a candid letter written to his friend and former representative for Massachusetts, Elbridge Gerry, in April 1786, King voiced his frustration with Congress's current predicament, writing that "Resolves have been passed upon Resolves--and letter after letter has been sent to the deficient States, and all without the desired effect. We are without money or the prospect of it in the Federal Treasury; and the States, many of them, care so little about the Union, that they take no measures to keep a representation in Congress." 

Acknowledged by his colleagues as an expert in financial and commercial matters, by early 1786 King chaired a Congressional committee tasked with assessing the near-bankrupt government’s finances, as well as lobbying for the passage of the new tax bill. In early February 1786, he drafted a stern message to Congress regarding the states' dragging approval of the impost, writing that if it failed, Congress would not be responsible for “those fatal Evils which will inevitably flow from a breach of Public faith, pledged by solemn contract, and a violation of those principles of Justice, which are the only solid Basis of the honor and prosperity of Nations” (Ernst, Rufus King: American Federalist, p. 78). By the fall, almost all of the states—with the notable exception of New York—had heeded this warning and agreed to the impost, but only five states had agreed to the supplementary tax, as it was deeply unpopular. Revealingly, in King’s own Massachusetts—one of the two largest states to agree to the supplementary tax—it, along with a massive direct tax passed in March 1786 by the state, contributed to the outbreak of Shays's Rebellion that summer, during the period in which we presume these notes were penned. 

Compounding this problem was Pennsylvania‘s peculiar stance on the taxes, which threatened to derail the entire effort. To gain their approval of the impost they tied it to the condition that all of the other states adopt both taxes, a highly unlikely scenario. As the taxes seemed destined to suffer the same fate as the 1781 impost, the government was now more prostrate than ever. With the government’s collapse now seemingly imminent, Congress determined that for the sake of the Union the impost alone must pass. They agreed that the supplementary tax could be separated and go into effect in the future, pending its eventual (if ever), approval by the states. In pursuit of this, in September 1786, King and James Monroe, who sat on the same financial committee, were sent to Philadelphia to negotiate with the state legislature in the hopes of persuading them to alter their stance. If successful, it might create enough pressure on New York, who had yet to approve the impost, and save the nation from collapse. The stakes were high. 

This document, a unique and unrecorded glimpse into these heady and contentious debates, was presumably made by King sometime before that trip to Philadelphia. At the top of the first page, King notes that this memo’s “object…is the separation of the imp(ost). & S(upplementary). F(und)“, and then, in eight numbered sections, he spells out arguments regarding the two taxes, and their effects on the national revenue and debt. For this he calculates foreign and domestic debt, interest, and their repayment under the proposed tax plans, noting that the impost's adoption will fix the “national embarrassments, and in a short time fix the Faith and honor of our Country upon a solid foundation…” Notably, the larger part of the second page is concerned “particularly to Pen(nsylvania)”, and makes calculations based on their debts, funding bills, and quotas.

An inscription in another hand at the top of the first page indicates that these notes were drafted in preparation for a speech. King was remembered for his impressive oratory skills, and was slated to give a speech to the Pennsylvania legislature during his visit with Monroe. For unknown reasons, King changed his typical speech writing habits for this occasion, and after having “taken a good deal of pains to examine and arrange the matter of my discourse”, attempted to memorize his speech and deliver it without notes (The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, Vol. I, p. 127). After several embarrassing false starts before the Legislature he gave the floor to Monroe, who spoke on the issue at hand. Taking time to compose himself, when Monroe finished King retook the floor and “proceeded to deliver an oration, which was memorable among all who heard it, and which he himself has often said was possibly the best and most effective he ever made." (p. 127) Apparently, "no trace remains of the nature, scope, or topics of the speech.” (p. 127). Ultimately, Monroe and King failed to convince the Pennsylvania legislature to alter its stance, as they deferred the matter until their next session. Regardless, this was rendered moot as New York refused to approve the taxes, cementing the Confederation’s all but certain demise. 

At this same time, 160 miles south in Annapolis, delegates from five states met to discuss improving interstate commerce and agreed to meet in May 1787 in Philadelphia to finally address the defects of the Articles of Confederation. King would play a key role at what became the Constitutional Convention, held from May to September, 1787, and representing his home state of Massachusetts. “At age 32, King was not only one of the most youthful of the delegates at Philadelphia, but was also one of the most important. He numbered among the most capable orators. Furthermore, he attended every session. Although he came to the convention unconvinced that major changes should be made in the Articles of Confederation, his views underwent a startling transformation during the debates. With Madison, he became a leading figure in the nationalist caucus. He served with distinction on the Committee on Postponed Matters and the Committee of Style. He also took notes on the proceedings, which have been valuable to historians.” (National Archives)

Transcription available upon request.